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This study revisits different experimental data sets that explore social behavior in
economic games and uncovers that many treatment effects may be gender-specific.
In general, men and women do not differ in “neutral” baselines. However, we
find that social framing tends to reinforce prosocial behavior in women but not
men, whereas encouraging reflection decreases the prosociality of males but not
females. The treatment effects are sometimes statistically different across genders
and sometimes not but never go in the opposite direction. These findings suggest
that (i) the social behavior of both sexes is malleable but each gender responds
to different aspects of the social context; and (ii) gender differences observed in
some studies might be the result of particular features of the experimental design.
Our results contribute to the literature on prosocial behavior and may improve
our understanding of the origins of human prosociality. We discuss the possible
link between the observed differential treatment effects across genders and the
differing male and female brain network connectivity, documented in recent neural
studies.
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Introduction
Prosociality is defined as any voluntary behavior intended to benefit other people and economic
games have proven useful tools to learn about the nature of social preferences and motivations
behind this behavior (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Different variations of the benchmark
games have been tested in the laboratory and in the field to analyze the determinants of human
prosocial behavior and how it varies across different socio-economic contexts (Camerer, 2003) and
social framings (Carpenter et al., 2003).
This study focuses on the role that gender plays in prosocial behavior. The experimental
evidence on gender differences in social preferences is mixed (see Camerer, 2003; Croson and
Gneezy, 2009, for reviews) However, rather than analyzying whether one sex is more prosocial than
the other, as it is standard in the literature (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), we present evidence on
gender differences on how males and females react to treatment variations (differential treatment
effects, hereafter). To this end, we revisit several existing experimental data sets containing at least
one treatment manipulation, and analyze gender-specific treatment effects with a special focus on
two aspects of the experimental design, social framing and reflection enhancement. The original
studies either find aggregate treatment effects on prosocial behavior or not and, although they
generally control for gender within treatments, they do not typically explore differential treatment
effects across the two sexes. This is the objective of our study.
Our hypothesis is that the mixed results on gender effects may have to do with the
fact that different framing and conditions of the experiment may affect male and female
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subjects differently. In particular, we hypothesize that when
the details of the experiment are put into a more ‘‘social
frame’’, female subjects will increase their prosociality
with respect to a neutral baseline more than males, and
that, when the frame allows or primes reflection, men
will adjust their behavior toward their self-interest more
than women.
The first hypothesis is suggested by the evidence that females
react more than men to social and emotional stimuli in many
contexts (see e.g., Brody and Hall, 1993, or McManis et al.,
2001, among many others). Given this evidence, we expect
this phenomenon to extend to social dilemma-like situations.
This is consistent with Ellingsen et al. (2012, 2013) who run
a Prisoners’ Dilemma experiment labeling the game either as
‘‘Community Game’’ or ‘‘Stock Market Game.’’ They observe
that men and women are not different under the Stock Market
frame. The Community treatment increases cooperation with
respect to Stock Market but the effect is solely driven by the
female participants. However, none of these two frames can be
considered a neutral, context-free benchmark as each of them
may induce a particular social norm.
As for the second hypothesis, the ability to regulate emotions
impacts one’s social relationships (Gross and John, 2003) and
large differences across males and females have been detected
in this domain (e.g., McRae et al., 2008). Since emotions are
naturally linked to social dilemma-like situations, the capacity
to control emotions may be associated with lower sharing and
less cooperation in these situations. In particular, men might be
more able to abstract from the social and emotional aspects of
social dilemmas and behave more in line with their self-interest if
prompted. Several studies have analyzed how enhancing intuitive
and reflective decision making affects behavior in social contexts
(Rand et al., 2012, 2014; Rand and Nowak, 2013), but little is
known as to whether such enhancement affects men and women
differently.
The data confirm that women react more than men to
social stimuli in these games and men behave closer to self-
interested predictions with reflection and experience, compared
to neutral control treatments. Regression analysis reveals that
these differential treatment effects across men and women
are generally significant in the studies that allow for within-
subject comparisons but, even though they never go in the
opposite direction, these differences are not robustly observed
in our between-subject comparisons using the differences-in-
differences approach.
Materials and Methods
Previous literature has explored how experimental conditions
affect prosocial behavior in a large variety of experimental
games. This section introduces the economic games analyzed
in this study, summarizes the data, and describes the statistical
methodology applied to these data.
Economic Games
We analyze data from three economic games:
Dictator Game (DG). In the Dictator Game (DG), one
player, the Dictator, proposes a division of a fixed amount of
money between herself and another participant, the Recipient.
Since the Recipient cannot but accept the proposed division,
the amount given by the Dictator is considered an indicator
of prosocial behavior. In the experiments, people on average
give positive amounts of money to the Recipients but proposing
zero is not uncommon (Engel, 2011). Women give more
than men in some studies but gender effects are not robustly
observed (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Regarding social aspects
of the game, reducing the Dictator–Recipient social distance
and enhancing feelings toward the Recipient typically increase
giving (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Hoffman et al., 1996;
Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Brañas-Garza, 2006; Brañas-Garza et al.,
2012).
Ultimatum Game (UG). The Ultimatum Game (UG)
introduces one important modification to the DG. One player,
the Proposer, proposes a division of a fixed amount of
money between herself and another player, the Responder.
In contrast to the DG, the Responder observes the proposed
division and can either accept or reject it. If accepted, the
money is divided as proposed; if rejected, both players earn
zero. Hence, the Responder has a possibility to ‘‘punish’’ the
Proposer if the former views the proposed division as unfair.
The key difference between the Proposer and the Dictator is
that the decision of the latter can be considered an indicator
of her prosociality, while the former’s proposal confounds
prosociality with strategic concerns. Consequently, we focus
on the behavior of Responders. Self-interested individuals
accept any amount and the more fair-minded a Responder
is, the more likely she is to reject unfair divisions, with
the rejection likelihood decreasing by the amount proposed
for the Responder. In fact, offers below 30% are commonly
rejected in experiments with human subjects whereas offers
above 40% of the pie are rarely rejected; gender effects are
not consistent across studies (Camerer, 2003; Güth and Kocher,
2014).
Public Good Game (PGG). Public Good Game (PGG) is
a continuous multi-player version of a social dilemma. There
is a group of n players and each of them is endowed with
the same amount of money. The experimental subjects have
to decide how much of this amount they will hold in their
private account and how much they will contribute to the
public good. The money contributed to the public good is
multiplied by a factor larger than one but lower than n, and
placed into a public account. The payoff of each player in the
game is the sum of her private account and an n-th part of the
balance in the public account. Hence, the selfish choice is to
keep all the money in the private account. If everybody does,
the payoff of each player equals her endowment. The efficient
outcome is achieved if all contribute the entire amount. The
fraction of the endowment contributed to the public good serves
as a measure of social preferences. People typically contribute
positive amounts in one-shot PGG, with the average being
slightly above 50% of the endowment; a non-negligible fraction of
subjects never contribute anything (Camerer, 2003; Chaudhuri,
2011).
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Data
We focus on two types of experimental manipulations. Section
Results: Prosocial Behavior and Social Framing reports studies
that strengthen the social aspects of the games by introducing
social framing; Section Results: Prosocial Behavior and Reflection
analyzes experiments that promote (or inhibit) reflecting about
the decisions.
Study 1
Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) conduct a DG experiment under three
different treatments. In the benchmark, the Dictator proposes a
division between herself and an anonymous stranger (Neutral
treatment, N = 26, 16 females). Under one framing, subjects
share the money with one of their friends in a previously elicited
social network (Friends treatment, N = 27, 17 females). In a third
treatment, subjects are told in the experimental instructions that
the recipient ‘‘relies on you’’ (Framing treatment, N = 26, 17
females).
Study 2
Dreber et al. (2013) look at the effect of several types of
framing in the DG. We focus on their Study 3 that provides
the framing manipulation we are interested in and contains the
largest number of observations (see the original paper for details
concerning the other studies). We only consider donations
lower or equal to 50%. The fraction of hypergiving (giving
more than 50% of the endowment) is surprisingly large in their
study and contrasts starkly with the typical distribution in the
literature (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). This selection results
in 663 observations (291 females). Their two treatments differ
in whether the Recipient knows that her payoff comes from
a decision by another person (Recipient informed treatment,
N = 327, 145 females) or not (Recipient not informed treatment,
N = 336, 146 females). An important feature is that the Dictators
are informed about whether or not the Recipient knows about
the game. This is the framing we focus on here. Dreber et al.’s
study contains a second framing variation by labeling the
game as either Giving or Keeping game. As Dreber et al. have
also admit, whether this framing is social hinges on subjects’
interpretations.
Study 3
Grimm and Mengel (2011) analyze the effect of delay on
Responders’ decision in the UG. They conduct three treatments
varying the timing of the decisions. First, they check whether
imposing a delay, implemented by forcing participants to first
answer a questionnaire immediately after observing the proposal
and before making their decision (Delay, N = 132, 26 females),
changes their acceptance rate with respect to the standard order,
in which people decide right after observing the proposal (No
Delay (N = 84, 19 females). In another treatment (Change,
N = 126, 24 females), subjects respond right after learning the
offer (as in the No Delay treatment) but, once they finish filling
up the questionnaire, they are allowed to change their decision
(as in the Delay treatment). In this case, each Responder makes
two decisions: whether to reject right after observing the proposal
and whether to reject after filling up the questionnaire, and this
allows for within-subject comparisons.
Study 4
Brañas-Garza et al. (2013) conduct a repeated DG. They ran a
DG experiment in October 2010 and repeated it in May 2011
with the same group of subjects (N = 199, 87 females in 2010;
N = 163, 74 females in 2011; N = 136, 62 females in both). This
design is suited to test how people change their behavior in the
DG with experience and time delay and, as in Grimm and Mengel
(2011), allows for within-subject comparisons.
Study 5
Rand et al. (2012) run a number of variations of the PGG to
analyze how time pressure and time delay affect the contributions
to the public good. Our interest is on the enhancement
of reflection through delaying the decision. The Benchmark
treatment (N = 212, 88 females) is the standard PGG, without
any manipulation of timing, played on-line on the Amazon
Mechanical Turk platform (Rand, 2012). This Benchmark
treatment is compared to two variations: Time Pressure and Time
Delay. Under Time Pressure, the participants are instructed to
choose their contribution in less than 10 s; under Time Delay,
they are instructed to decide after 10 s elapse. However, due to
the typical lack of control of subjects in on-line experiments,
many subjects disobeyed the time constraints. Rand et al. (2012)
only consider the subjects who obeyed the constraints in their
main analysis. For comparability purposes, we first follow their
approach, leading to 194 (92 females) and 249 (97 females)
observations in the Time Pressure and Time Delay treatments,
respectively. We also repeat the analysis including the subjects
who did not obey the time constraint (N = 372, 169 females and
N = 308, 121 females, respectively).
Study 6
In another comparison, Rand et al. (2012) contrast the standard
PGG with four treatments in which they either prime intuitive
decisions or reflection. More precisely, before playing the PGG
as in the benchmark, subjects see a screen, in which they are
required to recall and describe in one paragraph a real-life
situation, in which they decided on the basis of their intuition or
reflection and whether the decision led to a good or bad outcome.
The four treatments are: (i) intuition-good; (ii) reflection-bad;
(iii) intuition-bad; and (iv) reflection-good. Since the first two
treatments prime the intuitive decision-making whereas the
last two prime reflection before a decision is made, Rand
et al. aggregate the first two as the Intuition-Priming treatment
(N = 175, 108 females) and the last two as Reflection-Priming
(N = 168, 98 females). We follow their approach.
Statistical Methodology
In each study, we analyze: (i) how the treatment manipulation
affects each gender separately; and (ii) whether any detected
gender differences are statistically significant. For objective (i),
we disaggregate the data by gender and compare, separately
for each gender, whether the behavior under the treatment
differs from the behavior in the benchmark. We run two-
sided non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (also known as
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Mann-Whitney two-sample tests) if two different samples are
compared and two-sided non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-
pair tests when the behavior of the same people under two
different treatment variations is contrasted. To address (ii), we
use the standard differences-in-differences approach. We pool
the control and treated observations and regress behavior on
a female dummy, a treatment dummy (equal to zero in the
benchmark treatments), and their interaction. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on subject when
applicable. The estimation technique differs depending on the
nature of the dependent variable (linear, ordered logit, and logit
regressions). We detect a differential treatment effect across
genders if the interaction term is significantly different from
zero (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Controlling for individual
heterogeneity has no effect on the reported estimates.
Results: Prosocial Behavior and Social
Framing
Study 1 (Brañas-Garza et al., 2010)
Brañas-Garza et al. report that subjects are more altruistic when
sharing with friends than with strangers (p = 0.013). Figure 1
disaggregates the average giving by male and female subjects in
the Neutral and Friends treatments, revealing that only women
react strongly to the treatment effect; men also increase their
giving but the effect is not significant (p = 0.006 for female;
p = 0.486 for male). However, men and women adjust their
behavior in the same direction; the estimated difference in the
treatment effect between the sexes goes in the correct direction
but is not significant in the ordered logistic regression (N= 53,
p = 0.338).
The same type of result is obtained in the Neutral-Framing
comparison. The overall treatment effect is significant (p = 0.015)
but, as illustrated in Figure 2, it is mostly driven by women
(p = 0.0073 for female; p = 0.4297 for male). The differences
in differences are again not significant in the ordered logistic
regression (N = 52, p = 0.431). Aggregating both treatments
FIGURE 1 | Giving in the Dictator Game (DG; data: Brañas-Garza et al.,
2010). Reducing the social distance between the Dictator and the Recipient
affects females but not males.
FIGURE 2 | Giving in the Dictator Game (data: Brañas-Garza et al.,
2010). Framing (“relies on you”) affects females but not males.
(Friends and Framing vs. Neutral) confirms no differential
treatment effect (N = 79, p = 0.337).
Study 2 (Dreber et al., 2013)
Dreber et al. find no effect on Dictators’ behavior of whether
or not the Recipient is informed and the Dictator knows that
(p = 0.359). Although women increase their giving more that men
when Recipients are informed (see Figure 3), the gender-specific
effects are not significant (p = 0.2010 for female; p = 0.9109 for
male). The OLS estimate of the differential treatment effect is not
significant (N = 663, p = 0.378). Despite never being significant,
all these effects are in the expected directions.
FIGURE 3 | Giving in the DG under two frames: Recipients are either
not informed where the money comes from or informed that it comes
from a game. The condition was known by the Dictator (Dreber et al., 2013).
Women seem to react more to the treatment effect, but the effects are never
significant.
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The second framing variation in Dreber et al. (2013) tests the
effect of labeling the game as either Giving or Keeping game. The
aggregate effect is not significant (p = 0.928); women again seem
to increase their giving more that men under the Keeping frame
but the changes are not significant (p = 0.482 for female; p = 0.652
for male). The differential treatment effect is also not significant
(p = 0.422). As mentioned above and noted by Dreber et al.
the prosocial interpretation of this frame (Giving vs. Keeping) is
disputable though.
To summarize, when the experimental design includes
a change in the social distance between the Dictator and
the Recipient or enhances the social nature of the game,
the presented evidence suggests that women seem to react
to social or emotional cues while male reactions are not
statistically significant, but the difference between the two sexes
is not statistically significant when applying the differences-in-
differences approach. We could thus conclude in terms of Croson
and Gneezy (2009) that ‘‘the social preferences of women are more
situationally specific than those of men.’’ However, as we shall see
below, this is not always the case; other design elements trigger
large responses in men but not in women.
Results: Prosocial Behavior and Reflection
Study 3 (Grimm and Mengel, 2011)
Grimm and Mengel observe that a 10-min delay in the decision
as to whether to accept or reject in the UG significantly increases
the acceptance rate from 73.8% to 89.4% (Delay vs. No Delay:
p = 0.003). Figure 4 uncovers that the treatment effect is
only driven by male subjects (p = 0.001); women are virtually
unaffected by the delay (p = 0.873). This is robust to only
considering offers below 30% or 40% of the pie. Furthermore,
the differences-in-differences logistic regression reveal that this
difference between men and women is statistically significant
(N = 216, p = 0.054).
In the same vein, rejections are lower in the Change treatment
with respect to the No Delay baseline overall (p = 0.013) but
the effect is driven by males only (see Figure 5). For men, the
FIGURE 4 | The acceptance rate of all proposals by Responders in the
Ultimatum Game (UG) for the Delay and No Delay treatments (Grimm
and Mengel, 2011), disaggregated by gender. The treatment effect is only
significant for males, independently of whether we consider all or only low
proposals.
FIGURE 5 | The acceptance rate of proposals by Responders in the
Ultimatum Game (UG) for the no delay and change treatments (Grimm
and Mengel, 2011), disaggregated by gender. The treatment effect is only
significant for males and robust to considering low offers.
fraction of accepted offers rises with respect to the baseline when
allowed to change their decisions (p = 0.016), while the treatment
differences are not significant in women (p = 0.456). The results
are again robust if we restrict the analysis to low offers. In
this case, the differential treatment effects are not significantly
different across genders (N = 210, p = 0.715).
Comparing the two decisions in the Change treatment
(within-subject), there is significantly less rejection after the
10-min delay needed to fill up the questionnaire (p = 0.001).
The gender-specific tests show that men change their decision
considerably while women do not (p = 0.007 for male, p = 0.180
for female). The aggregate effects remain significant for offers
below 40% (p = 0.031) but disappears in the gender-specific
comparisons (p = 0.109 for male, p = 0.289 for female). Since
we compare behavior of the same subject, we regress a dummy
for people that changed their decision from reject to accept on a
constant and a female dummy in order to analyze whether males
and females react differently to the chance of changing their
decision. The estimated coefficients uncover that men react more
than women to the change option (logistic regression, p = 0.085);
this effect is stronger for offers below 40% of the stake (p = 0.040).
Study 4 (Brañas-Garza et al., 2013)
Previous experience with a game allows for further reasoning
about behavior and for potential learning. Brañas-Garza et al.
design a study, in which people play the DG twice. In line with
the above evidence, we hypothesize that the time elapsed between
both games may affect men more than women.
Overall, people decrease their sharing from the first to the
second repetition (see Figure 6). The aggregate and gender-
specific effects are significant (p < 0.0001 in all cases). However,
the adjustment is stronger for men than for women: no gender
difference in giving exists in 2010 (p = 0.8030), while 1 year
later women share more than men (p = 0.0164). We conduct
panel-data analysis to analyze carefully the differential treatment
effects: the difference between genders is not significant in the
whole sample (N = 225, p = 0.198) but regressions restricted to
subjects who did not increase their giving (over 91%) reveal a
differential treatment effect (N = 209, p = 0.024).
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FIGURE 6 | Giving in the Dictator Game by the same subjects in 2010
and 1 year later (Brañas-Garza et al., 2013), disaggregated by gender.
Even though both genders decrease significantly their giving, men adjust their
behavior more than women.
Study 5 (Rand et al., 2012)
People give more under time pressure than in the standard PGG
and more in the latter case than under time delay in Rand
et al. (Benchmark vs. Time Pressure: p = 0.058; Benchmark vs.
Time Delay: p = 0.028). We disaggregate their data by gender
and graph the average contributions (%) to the public good in
Figure 7, left. In case of the time obeying subjects, we observe
no treatment difference either for men or for women between
the Benchmark and any of the two variations (Benchmark vs.
Time Pressure: p = 0.281 for males, p = 0.138 for females;
Benchmark vs. Time Delay: p = 0.114 for males, p = 0.120
for females). The comparisons between the Time Pressure and
Time Delay conditions are statistically significant on aggregate
(p < 0.0001), for men (p = 0.008) and for women (p = 0.001).
Figure 7, left, illustrates that men contribute somehow less than
women but the differences are statistically weak (see Rand et al.,
2012 for an exhaustive analysis). The interactions between the
treatment (Time Pressure or Time Delay) and gender are never
significant, showing no differential treatment effects (p > 0.4).
This evidence does not support our working hypothesis but does
not go against it.
In contrast, if we consider all the subjects and not only those
who obey the time constraints, the results are in line with our
hypothesis; see Figure 7, right. The Time Delay treatment is
different from the Benchmark on aggregate (p = 0.056), mostly
due to men’s behavior (p = 0.078 for male, p = 0.385 for female).
The results in the Time Pressure treatment are not different from
the Benchmark (p > 0.56 for all cases). The differences in how
men and women react to the treatments are never significant
(p > 0.4) However, since we cannot tell why people do not obey
the time constraint or whether those who do not are different
from those who do, it is difficult to interpret the differences
between these results and those that exclude the time-disobeying
subjects.
Study 6 (Rand et al., 2012)
As for the comparisons between the Intuition-Priming and the
Reflection-Priming treatments to the baseline, the difference
between the Benchmark and Intuition-Priming is significant for
no sex (p = 0.4879 for males, p = 0.4775 for females) and the
difference between the Benchmark and the Reflection-Priming
treatment is weakly significant for males (p = 0.0922) but not for
females (p = 0.3806). The comparison between Intuition-Priming
and Reflection-Priming is significant for males (p = 0.0489) but
not for females (p = 0.1063). These results are in harmony
with the above evidence that men but not women react to
reflection enhancing. In the regression analysis, the interaction
between gender and the treatment is never significant (p = 0.545),
suggesting no differential treatment effects (see Figure 8).
Overall, the data in this section suggest that allowing
or priming reflection in social decision-making decreases
prosociality and cooperation in men but less in women. This
contradicts the common view in experimental economics that
male exhibit more stable behavior in social games than women
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Miller and Ubeda, 2012) and calls for
a reformulation of the intuition-cooperation linkage proposed
FIGURE 7 | Average contribution in the Public Good Game (PGG) under three differing conditions. Time Pressure, Benchmark (without any time restriction),
and Time Delay (Rand et al., 2012). Left: only subjects obeying the time constraint; Right: all subjects.
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FIGURE 8 | Average percentage contribution in the PGG under three
differing conditions: Intuition Priming, neither intuition nor reflection
are enhanced (Benchmark), and Reflection Priming (Rand et al., 2010).
No gender is affected by Priming Intuition; only men react to Reflection
Priming significantly decreasing their contributions.
by Rand and his colleagues (Rand et al., 2012, 2014; Rand and
Nowak, 2013). These issues are discussed further in the next
section.
Discussion
We find some discrepancies across men and women in the way
they react to design manipulations. In particular, female social
behavior tends to be more affected by social and emotional
aspects of the experimental design, whereas men tend to adjust
their behavior more than women when subjects are motivated
to reason further about their behavior. This is reflected in that
only one gender generally reacts significantly to the treatment in
the data separated for men and women. The tests of different
reactions to treatment variations across genders are supported
in data sets that allow for within-subject comparisons (Grimm
and Mengel, 2011; Brañas-Garza et al., 2013) but the effects are
statistically weak in our between-subjects comparisons applying
the standard differences-in-differences approach. Consequently,
we view the present evidence as indicative and we stress that more
research on these issues is necessary.
Notwithstanding this, this study reveals that gender is an
important element of human prosociality as the mechanisms
stimulating or inhibiting social behavior seem to differ across
male and female subjects. This should not be a surprise, since
their social roles have differed for the most part of human history
and, depending on the social context, different behaviors are
expected from men and women in virtually all cultures around
the Globe (Eagly, 2013). If men and women follow different
norms for behavior in different social contexts, we are likely
to observe similar differences in the laboratory when there is a
framing that subjects can associate to the corresponding social
situation (see Carpenter et al., 2003).
One implication of our study is that women, rather than
being more prosocial, may appear more prosocial in some studies
as a result of the details of the experimental design (even if
the manipulation only affects males), but both genders behave
equally when the context is experimentally neutral, deprived
of a frame. These findings point to the crucial role of gender,
beyond the simple comparison of male and female behavior
within treatments, and suggest that the role of gender should be
investigated further.
The present evidence supports Croson and Gneezy (2009) in
that women care more about the social context. However, our
results contrast with their main conclusion and the common
belief in the experimental literature summarized by Croson and
Gneezy (2009, p. 1): ‘‘Social preferences of women are more
situationally specific than those of men; women are neither more
nor less socially oriented, but their social preferences are more
malleable.’’ The current paper illustrates that the social behavior
of both genders is malleable, but each responds to different
details of the context. Females react more to aspects of social
framing whereas males are more affected by reflection-related
manipulations.
We also contribute to the literature initiated by David
Rand and his coauthors (Rand et al., 2012, 2014; Rand and
Nowak, 2013) who argue that intuition enhances cooperative
behavior and reflection inhibits it. They hypothesize that people
internalize behavioral norms which are advantageous in their
daily life situations and apply them in atypical situations such
as lab experiments. Only when prompted to reason or reflect
about the new situation or in-lab experience, experimental
subjects behave more in line with their self-interest. To support
this hypothesis, this literature manipulates the timing of the
decisions in social dilemmas and looks at the differences between
experienced and inexperienced experimental subjects. Their data
largely support this hypothesis (see Rand et al., 2014). Our
evidence points to a potential interaction between gender and
this reflection-cooperation linkage. See also Kahneman (2011) or
Rubinstein (2007) for different arguments regarding the timing
of a decision.
The question is whether the detected behavioral differences
between men and women can be explained. To this end, we
appeal to social neuroscience, a field integrating neuroscience,
cognitive and social sciences (Cacioppo, 2002; Han and Northoff,
2008). Of particular interest is the recent research on the
structural connectome, the neural connectivity of the human
brain. The pattern of interconnections is a determinant of how
the global network, i.e., the brain, works (Hagmann, 2005; Sporns
et al., 2007; Bassett and Gazzaniga, 2011). Importantly, recent
research detected significant discrepancies in inter and intra-
hemispheral brain connections across genders (Gong et al., 2009;
Tomasi and Volkow, 2012; Ingalhalikar et al., 2014; but see also
Dennis et al., 2013). In a sample of 949 subjects, Ingalhalikar et al.
(2014) report that males exhibit higher intrahemispheric cortical
connectivity than females, while female brains display higher
interhemispheric and modular connectivity. They also find
higher modularity and transitivity (network measures reflecting
how easily a network can be divided into subnetworks) in males.
Based on this evidence, they conclude that female brains are
better adapted to facilitate the ‘‘communication’’ between the
modules of the brain as well as the analytical and sequential
reasoning modes of the left hemisphere and the intuitive
processing of information of the right hemisphere, whereas
males’ within-hemispheric supratentorial connectivity would
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enhance coordinated action (see also Cahill, 2014). Indeed, in
an earlier behavioral study that included the same experimental
subjects of Ingalhalikar et al. (2014), females outperformed males
on attention, word and face memory, and social cognition tests,
while males performed better on spatial processing and motor
and sensorimotor speed (Gur et al., 2012; Roalf et al., 2014;
Satterthwaite et al., 2014). Thus, consistent with the arguments
of Ingalhalikar et al. (2014), certain behavioral and cognitive
gender differences may be traced back to the differing patterns
of interconnectedness of male and female brains.
We hypothesize that the structure of the human connectome
could be related not only to cognitive and perceptual processes,
but also to social preferences and prosocial behavior. More
precisely, the nature of the detected differences in social
behavior of men and women might be associated to women’s
higher cross-module and interhemispherical connectivity that
facilitates the integration of modular functions. It has been
largely documented in neuroeconomics that different brain
modules are associated e.g., with negative emotions (for example,
anterior insula) and other brain areas are responsible for
cognitive control of emotional reactions (such as different
parts of the prefrontal cortex); Glimcher and Fehr (2013)
provide an excellent exhaustive review of this literature. Denser
wiring among modules and lobes in women may stimulate the
simultaneous involvement of these modules in social decision-
making. This could be behind women’s larger responsiveness
to social frames. Lower cross-module connectivity in men, in
contrast, may predispose them for easier ‘‘disconnection’’ of
modules, explaining partially why they can look less other-
regarding if they take time resolving the inner conflict between
selfishness and fairness. In fact, an asymmetry across sexes in
brain activation has already been observed in social contexts
(Singer et al., 2006).
These arguments are in line with Bullmore and Sporns
(2012) who propose that the architecture of the human brain
network is shaped by a trade-off between the biological costs
and the efficiency of the pattern of anatomical connectivity
in terms of its adaptive value (see also Niven and Laughlin,
2008; Bassett et al., 2010). We propose that this reasoning may
also govern the proper functioning of the brain and that such
evolutionary criterion may lie behind the gender-specific neural
circuitry. Women’s higher interhemispheric connectivity may
have evolved to allow for cheaper involvement of modules and
brain lobes in terms of biological costs while making decisions,
and complicates the ability to disconnect them, whereas male
brains seem to be better adapted to overcoming the conflict
between individual reward and other-regarding concerns.
Even though our results are consistent with these ideas,
this study can by no means be considered direct evidence of
the relationship between performance and brain connectivity.
This document seeks to stimulate future research that would
test whether such a direct link exists. Many neuroscientists
indeed call for further analysis of the brain-behavior linkage
(e.g., de Vries and Södersten, 2009; Biswal et al., 2010). The
presented evidence particularly calls for the link between the
architecture of the structural connectome and behavior in social
games. Such data would largely enhance the understanding of the
underpinnings of social preferences and human cooperation.
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